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I. INTRODUCTION
As of September 28, 2014, the death toll from the Ebola outbreak in West
Africa exceeded 3,000 people.1 The World Health Organization (WHO)
confirmed more than 6,500 people had been infected with the virus as of that
date, meaning that just under fifty percent of the people who contracted the
virus had died from it.2 Further, the WHO estimated that as many as 1.4
million people could have contracted the virus by January 2015.3 Though
shocking, these statistics are indicative of an even larger problem: there is no
cure, preventative vaccine, or approved anti-viral medicine currently
available to counter the Ebola virus.4 Instead, Ebola patients are most often
treated with intravenous fluids (IVs) to restore the patient’s lost electrolytes,
and with medicines that counter the other infections resulting from the
patient’s weakened immune system.5
Still, pharmaceutical companies and scientists are diligently working to
find a cure or a drug to combat this deadly virus.6 The National Institutes of
Health (NIH), a U.S. executive agency operating under the Department of
Health and Human Services that is responsible for biomedical research on a
national level, is providing substantial funding to aid pharmaceutical
companies in their efforts to develop Ebola vaccines and medicines.7
Specifically, the NIH and other U.S. governmental entities have aided Mapp
Biopharmaceutical Inc. (Mapp) by partially funding the development of an
experimental Ebola drug known as ZMapp.8 This experimental drug was
sent to West Africa to treat patients in July and August 2014.9
Justin Worland, Ebola Death Toll Tops 3,000, TIME (Sept. 26, 2014), https://time.com/34
33638/ebola-outbreak-death-toll/.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Treatment, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(CDC), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/treatment/index.html (last updated July 22, 2015)
[hereinafter Ebola: Treatment].
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Lydia Smith, Ebola Outbreak: Thailand’s Siriraj Hospital Creates ‘Antibody
Treatment’ for Deadly Virus, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ebola
-outbreak-thailands-siriraj-hospital-creates-antibody-treatment-deadly-virus-1467727 (explaining
that microbiologists are continuing efforts to find treatments for Ebola, even on an international
level).
7 NIAID Role in Ebola and Marbug Research, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.niaid.
nih.gov/topics/ebolamarburg/research/pages/default.aspx.
8 Id.
9 Dennis Lynch, Ebola: Three African Doctors Given Experimental ZMapp Drug, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/ebola-three-afircan-doctors-given-expe
rimental-zmapp-drug-1660596.
1
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At the time ZMapp was sent to West Africa to treat Ebola patients, Mapp
had not yet received U.S. Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval to
begin “Phase 1” clinical trials.10 Because Mapp did not undergo the Phase I
clinical trial process, ZMapp was never given to a human before July 2014.
Further, although ZMapp had been tested on monkeys prior to being
administered to Ebola patients, the results from those monkey trials had not
been published.11 Nevertheless, seven individuals suffering from Ebola
during the West African outbreak chose to take ZMapp despite the fact the
drug had not been proven effective or safe for human use.12
The use of ZMapp in this context was so controversial that the WHO
convened a group of experts to discuss and issue a statement about the
ethical implications involved.13 The WHO panel unanimously agreed that in
this specific outbreak scenario “there is an ethical imperative to offer the
available experimental interventions that have shown promising results in the
laboratory and in relevant animal models to patients and people at high risk
of developing the disease” as long as other strict criteria, like full disclosure
to the patient and reporting the effects of the medicine, were also met. 14
Though they agreed that the use of experimental medicine was ethical in this
context, the WHO panel did not approach the question of whether the
experimental drug use was legal.15
The legality of experimental drug use in international disease outbreak
contexts involves numerous complexities. For example, a jurisdictional
problem exists in the absence of an international agreement governing the
use of experimental medicine.16 Without such an agreement, it is difficult to
Id. During “Phase 1” clinical trials under the FDA drug approval process, the drug is
first introduced to healthy humans to determine its common side effects, and to study how the
human body processes the drug. The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe
and Effective, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (FDA), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/
consumers/ucm143534.htm.
11 The monkey trial results were not published until August 29, 2014. Xiangguo Qiu et al.,
Reversion of Advanced Ebola Virus Disease in Nonhuman Primates with ZMapp, NATURE,
Aug. 29, 2014, available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vnfv/ncurrent/pdf/nature13
777.pdf.
12 Celine Gounder, Op-Ed., Here’s the Current Status of New Drugs to Fight Ebola Virus
and What Works Best Now, REUTERS BLOG (Sept. 2, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2014/09/02/status-of-new-drugs-to-fight-mutating-ebola-virus/.
13 World Health Org. [WHO], Rep. of Advisory Panel to WHO, Ethical Considerations for
Use of Unregistered Interventions for Ebola Viral Disease, WHO/HIS/KER/GHE/14.1 (Aug.
11, 2014) [hereinafter Ethical Considerations].
14 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
15 Id. at 5–6.
16 See, e.g., Chiara Giorgetti, International Health Emergencies in Failed and Failing
States, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1347, 1353 (2013) (“[P]ublic health has become a matter of
10
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determine which state’s law governs the use of these drugs given that the
patients, pharmaceutical companies, and other relevant third party actors
could all potentially be from countries other than where the outbreak occurs.
Further, even if an international agreement governed the use of experimental
drugs, it is unclear where violators of this hypothetical agreement could be
held liable. Given the uncertainty of the legal landscape, the legal,
economic, and ethical ramifications of experimental drug use become the
guideposts that regulators should use in deciding whether to allow these
untested medicines to be administered to patients in disease outbreak
contexts.
This Note endeavors to analyze the scope of international law governing
the use of experimental medicine in disease outbreak contexts by answering
the question of which state governs the use of experimental medicine in these
scenarios, and how effective those laws are within the current Ebola outbreak
context. Part II provides a current contextual background, the 2014 Ebola
outbreak in West Africa, from which this Note will analyze the problems
involved with experimental drug use in an international disease outbreak. It
also provides an overview of the current state of the law on both a national
and an international level that could potentially affect or be affected by this
experimental drug use. Part III analyzes how the current state of the law
shapes decisions related to experimental drug use, including how uncertainty
affects pharmaceutical companies’ decisions about whether to produce and
provide access to these drugs. This Part further analyzes the potential effects
of allowing experimental drug use in international infectious disease
outbreak scenarios given legal uncertainty. This Note will argue that the
serious legal, economic, and ethical concerns that led to stringent
experimental drug regulation outside of the outbreak context are exacerbated
in the context of international epidemics; thus there is an even greater need
for regulatory intervention. Finally, this Note concludes by suggesting that
the WHO should serve as an emergency regulator to address the issues
specific to experimental medicines in disease outbreaks.

international concern, one that often cannot be addressed exclusively by one State, but that
requires action by the international community as a whole.”).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa
A full understanding of a current infectious disease outbreak, like the
2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, is necessary to clearly define the
problems that regulators face when governing the use of experimental drugs
in similar scenarios. The Ebola Virus Disease was discovered in Africa in
1976.17 Scientists believe bats are the natural carriers of Ebola, but the virus
also infects monkeys, chimpanzees, and gorillas.18 Humans become infected
through contact with fluids from infected animals.19 The virus spreads
between humans in multiple ways, including: “direct contact (through broken
skin or mucous membranes) with the blood, secretions, organs or other
bodily fluids of infected people, and with surfaces and materials (e.g.
bedding, clothing) contaminated with these fluids” as well as through contact
with deceased Ebola victims.20 Even when someone infected with the virus
recovers, they may still carry the virus for up to seven weeks after
recovery.21
The symptoms of Ebola include fever, muscle pains, vomiting, diarrhea,
and unexplained hemorrhaging.22 These symptoms can take up to twentyone days to appear after infection, but usually appear within eight to ten
days.23 After the symptoms first appear in an infected patient, the virus
typically develops over a ten-day period, leading to extreme bleeding, coma,
shock, and even death.24 Since, no cure exists for the Ebola virus, patients
that have survived generally possessed strong immune systems prior to
Outbreak Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbre
aks/history/chronology.html.
18 Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Transmission, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/transm
ission/index.html.
19 Ebola Virus Disease: Fact Sheet, WHO, http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs10
3/en/ [hereinafter Ebola: Fact Sheet].
20 Id.
21 Pauline Oosterhoff, Ebola Can Be Transmitted Sexually for Weeks After Recovery –
Education Is Critical, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 6:29 AM), http://www.theguardian.
com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/apr/22/sexual-health-ebola-semen-sierr
a-leone.
22 Ebola (Ebola Virus Disease): Signs and Symptoms, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/
symptoms/index.html.
23 Id.
24 Amanda L. Chan, What Actually Happens When a Person Is Infected with the Ebola
Virus, HUFFINGTON POST HEALTHY LIVING (Aug. 2, 2014, 9:24 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/ 2014/08/02/ebola-symptoms-infection-virus_n_5639456.html.
17
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infection or were not severely exposed to the virus.25 However, treatments
like IVs and prevention measures have been successful in decreasing the
mortality rate of Ebola in some circumstances.26
The WHO was notified of the Ebola virus infections in West Africa in
March 2014.27 This particular outbreak began in Guinea and spread to
Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the governmental health systems are
relatively weak.28 Those local governments, in conjunction with foreign
governments and international aid groups, have taken steps to contain the
virus, including: limiting or restricting international travel to and from
countries with high infection rates, making donations of monetary aid and
experimental vaccines, sending medical experts to provide guidance and
training to local medical aid workers,29 and even sending troops to increase
manpower.30
However, due to poor healthcare systems, lack of
governmental capacity to control the virus, and fear, the virus continues to
spread.31
Due to the poor healthcare systems and lack of necessary supplies in
affected countries, more than 240 doctors and aid workers have been infected
with Ebola during the current outbreak.32 One such doctor, Dr. Kent Brantly,
was the first American diagnosed with Ebola in July 2014.33 Upon learning
of Dr. Brantly’s infection, the NIH contacted Samaritan’s Purse, the
organization from whom Dr. Brantly worked, and offered to send an

Id.
Barriers to Rapid Containment of the Ebola Outbreak, WHO (Aug. 11, 2014), http://
www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/overview-august-2014/en/ [hereinafter Barriers to Rapid
Containment].
27 Ebola: Fact Sheet, supra note 19.
28 Id.
29 Lisa Schnirring, Countries Take More Control Steps as Ebola Totals Grow, UNIV. OF MINN.
CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y (CIDRAP) NEWS (Aug. 13, 2014), http://
www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/08/countries-take-more-control-steps-ebola-totalsgrow.
30 U.S. Troops Race to Stem Ebola Outbreak in Africa, CBS NEWS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/us-mobile-ebola-labs-open-liberia-this-week/.
31 Because the governments in these three heavily impacted West African countries are just
recovering from civil war, the healthcare systems lack the manpower, supplies, and organization
necessary to contain the Ebola virus. Barriers to Rapid Containment, supra note 26.
32 Unprecedented Number of Medical Staff Infected with Ebola, WHO (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/25-august-2014/en/.
33 Michaeleen Doucleff, 2 Americans Catch Ebola in Liberia, as Nigeria Reports First Case,
NPR BLOGS: GOATS & SODA (July 28, 2014, 2:01 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/goatsandsoda/
2014/07/28/336043452/2-americans-catch-ebola-in-liberia-as-nigeria-reports-first-case.
25
26
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experimental drug known as ZMapp to Liberia.34 Samaritan’s Purse
accepted the drug and it was administered to Dr. Brantly when his condition
significantly worsened.35 On August 2, 2014, Dr. Brantly was flown to the
U.S. to receive further treatment at Emory University Hospital.36 On August
21, 2014, Dr. Brantly was released from the hospital after what has been
described as a “miraculous” recovery.37
Dr. Brantly was not the only person given doses of the experimental
ZMapp drug; another U.S. aid worker received the medicine and survived.38
However, out of the seven people treated with ZMapp, at least two did not
survive the Ebola virus.39 Further, the U.S. Center for Disease Control
(CDC) has stated that the drug cannot be confirmed as an effective treatment,
despite its success in aiding in the recovery of some Ebola patients, because
ZMapp has not been tested in a controlled clinical trial.40 The positive
results in some patients who have received the drug could also be attributed
to the overall health of the patient prior to infection and the level of
supportive therapy the patient received.41 For example, two Americans that
received the ZMapp treatment and survived were transported back to the
U.S. where they received a high level of supportive treatment in a clean
environment.42
Although ZMapp cannot be proven to be effective in humans without
further drug trials, the drug was proven 100% effective in a monkey trial

34 Sanjay Gupta & Danielle Dellorto, Experimental Drug Likely Saved Ebola Patients,
CNN (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/04/health/experimental-ebola-serum/.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See John Bacon & Karen Weintraub, U.N. Endorses Use of Untested Ebola Medicines,
USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2014, 11:24 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/
08/12/priest-ebola-dies/13939545/ (explaining that a Spanish priest who received ZMapp later
died); Ebola Kills Liberia Doctor Despite ZMapp Treatment, BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28925491 (announcing the death of a Liberian doctor
who was given ZMapp).
40 See Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Information for Clinicians in U.S. Healthcare Settings,
CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/preparing/clinicians.html (stating that the
CDC cannot confirm the “safety, efficacy, or effectiveness” of any Ebola investigational
medicine).
41 Ebola: Treatment, supra note 4 (“Recovery from Ebola depends on good supportive care
and the patient’s immune response.”).
42 See Gupta & Dellorto, supra note 34 (describing the challenges of two American Ebola
patients being sent back to the U.S. for treatment).
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published in late August of 2014.43 The drug was given to eighteen monkeys
between three and five days after being infected with Ebola.44 The scientific
community is very optimistic about the results of the monkey trial due to the
drug’s high effective rate, and because the doses were given to the monkeys
days later than other experimental Ebola medicines.45 However, the
successful monkey trial does not necessarily serve as an accurate prediction
of how the drug could react in humans.46 Major differences between humans
infected with Ebola and the monkeys in this trial include: the way humans
are infected with Ebola and the way the monkeys were infected with Ebola in
a lab setting, the treatment window between humans and monkeys because
Ebola can take up to twenty-one days to develop in humans, and the potential
differences in side effects of the medicine.47 Still, prior to the drug being
given to Dr. Brantly, it had never been tested in humans.48
Along with its unknown human efficacy, the limited supply of ZMapp
created another ethical dilemma. After the seven doses were distributed,
Mapp declared that their supply of the drug was exhausted.49 With such a
limited supply of the drug available, questions of distributive justice arose.50
In dealing with these concerns, the WHO recommended consideration of
several factors such as the fairness of the distribution between countries and
between different population groups within those countries, the social
usefulness of the patient, and how advanced the disease was within a
patient.51

43 Xiangguo Qiu et al., supra note 11; ZMapp Cures Monkeys of Ebola Virus, CBS NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2014, 3:06 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/zmapp-cures-monkeys-of-ebolavirus/.
44 ZMapp Cures Monkeys of Ebola Virus, supra note 43.
45 Since the Ebola virus had developed to the point that the majority of the monkeys
involved in the trial were already showing symptoms, scientists described this particularly
high level of drug efficacy in the monkeys as an “extremely impressive” result. Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. Dr. Brantly gave informed consent to be treated with ZMapp after he had been
warned that the drug had never been used on humans but had been successful in the monkey
trial. Gupta & Dellorto, supra note 34.
49 ZMapp Cures Monkey of Ebola Virus, supra note 43.
50 Ethical Considerations, supra note 13, at 6.
51 This is not an exhaustive list of the criteria recommended by the WHO ethics panel.
Further, the panel did not recommend what priority level each of the factors should receive.
Id. Since the panel only made recommendations, the distribution of the medicine was actually
left up to the countries receiving the experimental drugs. Alexandra Sifferlin, WHO Outlines
Timeline for Experimental Ebola Drugs, TIME (Sept. 5, 2014), http://time.com/3274636/whotimeline-ebola-drugs/.
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ZMapp is not the only experimental treatment being developed and used
during this Ebola outbreak.52 The governments of multiple nations are
funding the development of several new drugs to help stop the virus.53
Further, the WHO has recommended that these new drugs and vaccines be
“fast-tracked” so that they can be put to immediate use.54 As discussed later
in this Note, the fact that these drugs are just beginning human testing phases
means that they could be tested for the first time on Ebola patients in West
Africa.55 Who will regulate these tests, and under what standard will these
drugs be regulated?
B. Experimental Drug Use and The Law
In this age of increased globalization, when infectious diseases like Ebola
can travel from Liberia to the U.S. in less than a twenty-four hour period,56
much of the existing law governing experimental medicine is outdated or
ineffective.57 Outside of the human experimentation context, drug regulation
on an international scale is effectively non-existent. Instead, current
experimental drug regulation is mostly managed on a nation-by-nation
basis.58 This disjointed approach leaves significant regulatory gaps that are
exposed during international emergency situations like the Ebola outbreak.
However, understanding the need for stricter experimental drug regulation
during outbreak scenarios requires an understanding of the current legal
landscape surrounding experimental drugs.
52 Ebola: The Race for Drugs and Vaccines, BBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.bbc.
com/news/health-28663217.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. (discussing many experimental drug and vaccine projects underway in West Africa).
56 This time frame is based on a flight from Dallas Fort Worth Airport to Roberts
International Airport. Some websites reported that the actual flight time could be as short as
fourteen hours; others reported that even with three layovers, the trip could be completed in
twenty-four hours. See, e.g., Flight Time from Dallas, TX to Monrovia, PROKERALA, http://
www.prokerala.com/travel/flight-time/from-dallas-tx/to-monrovia/ (stating that a nonstop
flight from Dallas, Texas to Monrovia, Liberia would take thirteen hours and fifty-eight
minutes).
57 See, e.g., Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergoing
Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
513, 530–35 (2002) (arguing that experimental drug and related research regulation was
ineffective to govern the ATZ trials and the resulting harmful human experimentation that
took place in Africa).
58 Lawrence O. Gostin & Eric A. Friedman, Towards a Framework Convention on Global
Health: A Transformative Agenda for Global Health Justice, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 1, 20–21 (2013).
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1. The Current International Legal Landscape
The use of experimental medicine and the management of clinical trials,
particularly human trials, is governed by four key internationally recognized
documents: the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki (Declaration),
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the
WHO-CIOMS Guidelines (Guidelines).59 The world first recognized a need
for the regulation of human medical experimentation when the Nuremberg
Tribunal exposed the atrocities of human experimentation that took place
during World War II.60 In United States v. Karl Brandt, the Nuremberg
Military Tribunal laid out ten ethical guidelines that were meant to govern
the future of medical experimentation on humans.61 These ten ethical
standards are commonly referred to as the “Nuremberg Code.”62 Notably,
among its ten ethical standards, the Nuremberg Code includes requirements
such as informed consent, for the experiment to be “designed and based on
the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history
of the disease,” for the degree of risk of the experiment not to outweigh the
benefits of the experiment, and for preparations to be made and facilities kept
such that the subject is protected from “even remote possibilities of injury,
disability, or death.”63 In short, the principles outlined in the Nuremberg
Code were aimed at protecting human rights at the expense of future
research.64 Though the Nuremberg Code is widely thought of as the first
See David M. Carr, Note, Pfizer’s Epidemic: A Need for International Regulation of Human
Experimentation in Developing Countries, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 15, 19 (2003) (crediting
the Nuremberg Code, Declaration of Helsinki, and the WHO-CIOMS Guidelines as the “central
standards” governing current experimental research); Finnuala Kelleher, Note, The
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in
Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 67, 71, 73 (2004) (adding the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the list of influential documents to the extent that it
made informed consent to human experimentation part of binding international law).
60 Meier, supra note 57, at 521.
61 UNITED STATES V. KARL BRANDT, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 (1948) [hereinafter
NUREMBERG CODE], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-crimin
als_Vol-II.pdf.
62 Meier, supra note 57, at 523.
63 NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 61. “Informed consent requires that the physician inform
the potential patient of the nature, the aims, methods, risks and benefits, alternative treatments
available, and of the patient’s ability to refuse to participate or withdraw from the research.”
Carr, supra note 59, at 25–26.
64 Kristen Farrell, Comment, Human Experimentation in Developing Countries: Improving
International Practices by Identifying Vulnerable Populations and Allocating Fair Benefits, 9
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 136, 141 (2006).
59
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international regulation of medical experimentation, its practical application
is extremely limited because it is not legally binding, and is viewed as “too
uncompromising and too inhospitable to the advancement of science.”65
The Declaration of Helsinki was, in many respects, the international
response to the Nuremberg Code by the medical community.66 It is a
document created, disseminated, and regularly updated by the World
Medical Association (WMA), an international association of private
physicians created to “work for the highest possible standards of ethical
behaviour and care by physicians”67 and to espouse the WMA’s position
regarding “biomedical research involving human subjects.”68
The
Declaration includes provisions regarding informed consent, privacy and
confidentiality, necessary research protocols, and the post-trial dissemination
of results.69
The Declaration notably recognizes that “vulnerable”
populations should receive “specifically considered protection” because of
their “increased likelihood of being wronged or of incurring additional harm”
as a result of the medical experimentation.70 Further, the Declaration
specifically identifies the ethical boundaries of using an “unproven
intervention” like ZMapp.71 In doing so, it provides a very limited set of
circumstances under which unproven interventions should be administered.
The Declaration only allows this use “where proven interventions do not
exist or other known interventions have been ineffective.72 Further, the
Declaration requires the physician to seek expert advice and obtain the
informed consent of the patient.73 Finally, the Declaration provides that the
unproven interventions should only be administered “if in the physician’s
Meier, supra note 57, at 524 (quoting Jay Katz, The Consent Principle of the Nuremberg
Code: Its Significance Then and Now, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE:
HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 235 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin
eds., 1992)).
66 World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Research Involving
Human Subjects (2008) [hereinafter Declaration of Helsinki], available at http://www.wma.
net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/. The Declaration was the first time doctors attempted
self-regulation via an international document that allowed for more leniency than the
Nuremberg Code. Meier, supra note 57, at 525. See also Carr, supra note 59, at 22–23
(describing the events leading to the creation of the Declaration).
67 About the World Medical Association, WORLD MED. ASS’N, http://www.wma.net/en/60
about/index.html.
68 History: Declaration of Helsinki, WORLD MED. ASS’N, http://www.wma.net/en/60about/
70history/01declarationHelsinki/index.html.
69 Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 66.
70 Id. paras. 19–20.
71 Id. para. 37.
72 Id.
73 Id.
65
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judgment it offers hope of saving life, re-establishing health or alleviating
suffering.”74
While the Declaration is more specific than the Nuremberg Code
regarding the application of many ethical principles, the Declaration remains
susceptible to interpretation.75 Further, like the Nuremberg Code, the
Declaration is not a legally binding document.76 Because its ethical
standards lack enforceability both legally and medically, the Declaration has
“little effect on the regulation of human research.”77
The WHO and the Council of the International Organization of Medical
Sciences developed the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical
Research Involving Human Subjects to provide guidance for nations
developing medical regulations.78 One of the driving principles behind the
Guidelines is that they require research involving human experimentation to
be conducted with “respect for persons, beneficence and justice.”79 While
the Guidelines are currently the most expansive and specific international
instrument governing experimental drug use, they, like the Nuremberg Code
and the Declaration, are neither enforceable nor binding international law.80
The ICCPR is the only legally binding treaty to address the use of human
experimentation.81 Thus, it tangentially governs the use of experimental
medicine. Article 7, the ICCPR’s only medically related article, reads: “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”82 However, because of its
limited application to the experimental drug context, its applicability to state
Id.
See Meier, supra note 57, at 531 (quoting M. Cheriff Bassiouni et al., An Appraisal of
Human Experimentation in International Law and Practice: The Need for International
Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1597, 1601 (1981)).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCI. (CIOMS), in collaboration with the WHO,
INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
SUBJECTS (Geneva 2002) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], available at http://www.cioms.ch/public
ations/guidelines/guidelines_nov_2002_blurb.htm (explaining that the Guidelines were meant
to provide guidance to developing countries on how to apply the ethical standards from the
Declaration given their “socioeconomic circumstances” and “administrative arrangements”);
see also Meier, supra note 57, at 526–27.
79 GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at 17.
80 See Carr, supra note 59, at 48 (explaining that neither the Nuremberg Code, Declarations,
nor Guidelines are binding on nations).
81 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Kelleher, supra note 59, at 73.
82 ICCPR, supra note 81.
74
75
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actors only, and its lack of self-enforcement, the ICCPR is ineffective at
governing the use of experimental medicine except to the extent that it
recognizes informed consent as a principle of international law.83
2. The Role of the WHO
The WHO is the primary body that oversees international health
matters.84 It consists of 194 member states and is governed primarily by the
World Health Assembly.85 The WHO is responsible for coordinating global
health initiatives, providing support to countries that request aid in building
stable healthcare systems, and providing support in training healthcare
workers.86 The WHO’s primary objective is “the attainment by all peoples
of the highest possible level of health.”87 Although the WHO has both
normative and directive powers, its constitution lacks enforcement power
against member states because it does not include an expulsion provision.88
However, in recent years, through resolutions that serve as directives to
member states, the WHO has updated and bolstered two important
international regulatory instruments: the 2005 International Health
Regulations (IHR) and the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
(GOARN).89
The WHO defines the IHR as “an international legal instrument that is
binding on 196 countries across the globe, including all the Member States of
[the] WHO. Their aim is to help the international community prevent and
respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders
and threaten people worldwide.”90 The IHR serve as a “step forward in [the]
WHO’s ability to control and prevent health emergencies of an international
Kelleher, supra note 59, at 73.
Giorgetti, supra note 16, at 1359.
85 Id.; see also CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. art. 10, available at http://www.who.
int/governance/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf (explaining the organizational structure of the
WHO).
86 Giorgetti, supra note 16, at 1360.
87 CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. art. 1, available at http://www.who.int/governanc
e/eb/who_constitution_en.pdf.
88 Giorgetti, supra note 16, at 1359–60.
89 INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005) (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter IHR 2005],
available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/43883/1/9789241580410_eng.pdf; WHO
Dep’t of Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, Global Outbreak Alert and
Response, WHO/CDS/CSR/2000.3, available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publicatio
ns/surveillance/whocdscsr2003.pdf?ua=1.
90 IHR 2005, supra note 89, art. 2 (stating that the goal of the IHR is to “prevent, protect
against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease”).
83
84
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nature by requiring countries to report certain disease outbreaks and public
health events to [the] WHO, and defining the rights and obligations of
Member States to report public health events.”91 However, the emphasis of
the IHR is on reporting and monitoring these “public health events” rather
than regulating the measures taken to control and eliminate the infectious
disease.92 The IHR does not address the use of experimental drugs or
vaccines.93
The IHR provides for the establishment of an “Emergency Committee” to
address specific issues as they emerge in public health emergencies.94 The
IHR Emergency Committee has met multiple times to address the West
Africa Ebola outbreak, and met twice during the height of infections during
2014.95 During the first Emergency Committee meeting, the committee
members and attending member states unanimously decided that the
outbreak had reached the level of a “Public Health Emergency of
International Concern.”96 The Committee also made several suggestions to
the Director-General for addressing the Ebola outbreak in accordance with
the IHR regulations.97 These suggestions include: the declaration of a state
of emergency, the establishment of pipelines of supplies, and the
establishment of strict barriers to international travel to and from states
where Ebola was being transmitted; increased surveillance and monitoring of
suspicious fevers and deaths, and the institution of strict guidelines if cases
of Ebola are confirmed in states that border the transmission states and those
with potential Ebola cases; continuance of relatively unrestricted trade and
travel, and provision of relevant information to the general public for all

Giorgetti, supra note 16, at 1369.
Compare IHR 2005, supra note 89, art. 15(3) (limiting the WHO to making timeconstrained recommendations rather than binding regulations about health measures), with id.
art. 5(1) (mandating that member states put assessment, notification, and report measures into
effect within five years).
93 The IHR makes no reference to experimental medicine. IHR 2005, supra note 89.
94 Id. art. 48.
95 Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak in West Africa, WHO (Aug. 8, 2014) [hereinafter 1st Meeting of IHR Emergency
Committee],
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/;
Statement on the 2nd Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola
Outbreak in West Africa, WHO (Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter 2nd Meeting of IHR Emergency
Committee], http://www.who.int/entity/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-2nd-ihr-mee
ting/en/index.html.
96 1st Meeting of IHR Emergency Committee, supra note 95.
97 Id.
91
92
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other states.98 The Director-General implemented this advice as “Temporary
Recommendations” under IHR Article 19.99
Because the Ebola virus continued to spread during the month of
September, the Emergency Committee met again, through electronic
communications, to address areas of concern.100 Since many states had
issued international travel bans to West African countries, the Emergency
Committee was concerned with the economic welfare of the area; thus, the
Committee encouraged states to restore travel and trade with these areas in
accordance with the IHR.101 Further, the Committee encouraged greater
vigilance by states to ensure that healthcare workers were adequately
supplied with safety equipment and were trained for handling the virus.102
The Director-General used these suggestions to further explain and extend
the timeframe of the “Temporary Recommendations” that were implemented
in August.103
Another key regulatory instrument of the WHO is GOARN. The WHO
defines GOARN as a technical “collaboration of existing institutions and
networks . . . [who] pool[ ] human and technical resources for rapid
identification, confirmation and response to outbreaks of international
importance.”104 As an informational network, GOARN “contributes towards
global health security” through efforts aimed at organizing planning and
preparedness measures, efficiently identifying global health emergencies,
and ensuring supplies and technical assistance reach the affected countries.105
In an effort to standardize global epidemic response, GOARN has published
its “Guiding Principles of International Outbreak Alert and Response” and
accompanying protocols that provide guidance on response measures
including “epidemiological, laboratory, clinical management, research,
communications, logistics support, security, evacuation and communications
systems.”106 Though the network is one of the primary regulators of
epidemic response measures, neither the “Guiding Principles” nor the
Id.
Id.
100 2nd Meeting of IHR Emergency Committee, supra note 95.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, WHO, http://www.who.int/ihr/alert_and_
response/outbreak-network/en/.
105 Id.
106 Id.; see also Guiding Principles for International Outbreak Alert and Response, WHO,
http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/guidingprinciples/en/ (elaborating on efforts by
GOARN to standardize global epidemic response).
98
99
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protocols have specifically addressed whether the use of experimental
medicine should be encouraged.107
Thus, because it does not include experimental drug use in any of its
binding regulatory documents,108 the WHO only regulates the international
use of experimental medicine through “non-binding global health
instruments, or ‘soft law.’ ”109 One way the WHO uses soft law in the
experimental medicine context is through the promulgation of the Guidelines
mentioned above.110 The document consists of twenty-one guidelines
broadly covering “(1) ethical review; (2) informed consent; (3) populations
with limited resources; (4) choice of control method; (5) vulnerable groups;
(6) women as research participants; (6) confidentiality; (7) compensation; (8)
ethical and scientific review of research; and (9) the obligation to provide
healthcare services.”111
Of particular importance to this Note are: Guideline 10, which governs
human experimentation in “populations and communities of limited
resources” by requiring that the researcher “make every effort to ensure that:
the research is responsive to the health needs and the priorities of the
population . . . and any intervention or product developed . . . will be made
reasonably available for the benefit of that population”;112 Guideline 12,
which ensures that the “burdens and benefits of the research will be equitably
distributed” amongst the communities that are invited to be subjects of the
research;113 Guideline 13, which provides for special protection for
vulnerable groups, including those individuals with insufficient education or
resources and those otherwise unable to protect their own interests;114 and
Guideline 19, which provides for the payment of medical expenses for
individuals that are injured and for compensation to the families of those that

See Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network, supra note 104 (omitting any
reference to the use of experimental medicine).
108 The WHO Constitution and three multi-lateral treaties, the WHO Regulations No. 1
Regarding Nomenclature with Respect to Diseases and Causes of Death, the IHR, and the
Frameworks Convention on Tobacco Control, serve as the binding instruments governing
global health. Gostin & Friedman, supra note 58, at 20–21.
109 Id. at 22.
110 See Meier, supra note 57, at 526–27 (explaining the importance of the Guidelines in the
context of informed consent).
111 Amy F. Wollensack, Note, Closing the Constant Garden: The Regulation and
Responsibility of U.S. Pharmaceutical Companies Doing Research on Human Subjects in
Developing Nations, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 747, 750 (2007).
112 GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at Guideline 10.
113 Id. at Guideline 12.
114 Id. at Guideline 13.
107
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died as a result of the experimentation.115 Despite their relevancy, the
Guidelines are limited in their practical application.116
Another way the WHO governs experimental medicine and its use is
through the promulgation of medicine regulation standards in its WHO
Medicines Regulatory Package.117 The “package” is a collection of papers
published by the WHO that addresses varying issues of drug regulation,
including effective regulation guidelines, handbooks for establishing clinical
trials, effective drug storage and distribution practices, and the current status
of international drug regulation harmonization efforts.118 The collection
contains several documents related to the best practices of clinical and nonclinical trials,119 a guide to good manufacturing practices for the
development of experimental medicines,120 and multiple guides to
manufacturing drugs.121 All of these instruments govern the use and
development of experimental medicines in some manner.

Id. at Guideline 19.
See Tiffany A. Hetland, Note, Abdullahi v. Pfizer & The Alien Tort Statute: Kicking
Open A Door Left Slightly Ajar by Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 4 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 427, 454 (2011) (explaining that the limited analysis of the Guidelines in both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009) was
justified because the Guidelines are merely “guidelines” and thus “lack probative value”); see
also Meier, supra note 57, at 532 (discussing how the flexibility of the Guidelines led to
“exploitation of developing countries” when they were applied to the African short course
AZT trials that used African subjects to test a medication intended to prevent the transmission
of HIV/AIDs).
117 WHO, WHO MEDICINES REGULATORY PACKAGE (3d ed. 2014), available at http://infocol
lections.org/medregpack/interface/home.htm.
118 Id.
119 See, e.g., WHO, Good Clinical Laboratory Practice (2009), in WHO MEDICINES
REGULATORY PACKAGE, supra note 117, available at http://infocollections.org/medregpack/d
ocuments/d2003/d2003.pdf (establishing practices for the analysis of the efficacy of medicines
in clinical settings); WHO, Handbook: Good Laboratory Practice (GLP): Quality Practices
for Regulated Non-Clinical Research and Development (2d ed. 2009), in WHO MEDICINES
REGULATORY PACKAGE, supra note 117, available at http://infocollections.org/medregpack/
documents/d0067/d0067.pdf (detailing best practices for the development of medicines in a
non-clinical context).
120 See WHO, Good Manufacturing Practices: Supplementary Guidelines for the
Manufacture of Investigational Pharmaceutical Products for Clinical Trials in Humans, in
WHO MEDICINES REGULATORY PACKAGE, supra note 117, available at http://infocollections.
org/medregpack/documents/d0079/d0079.pdf (providing guidelines to experimental drug
manufacturers to ensure consistency and quality in drugs developed for human trials).
121 See, e.g., WHO, Annex 5: Basic Elements of Good Manufacturing Practices in
Pharmaceutical Production (2002), in WHO MEDICINES REGULATORY PACKAGE, supra note
117, available at http://infocollections.org/medregpack/documents/d0089/d0089.pdf (explaining
the necessity for uniform manufacturing practices for pharmaceuticals).
115
116
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3. Least Developed Countries and the Absence of Enforceable, Practical
Law
As of 2002, only twenty percent of WHO member states had a “well
developed drug regulation system,” and all of those states were industrialized
nations.122 Fifteen states, or thirty percent of WHO member states, had
either no drug regulatory authority in place at all or had a drug regulatory
authority that was functionally non-existent.123 Developing countries
generally have the weakest drug regulatory authorities and thus experience
“safety, efficacy and quality” problems with medicines.124 Because of the
gap between the regulatory approaches of developed nations and developing
nations, both the WHO and the FDA hold training conferences to help
increase the overall effectiveness of global drug regulation.125 Despite these
efforts, the drug regulatory systems in developing countries, especially in
Africa, are weak because the systems are newly established, subject to
corruption, disorganized, or non-existent.126
III. ANALYSIS
The Ebola outbreak provides an excellent example of the insufficiency of
the current state of the law governing experimental drugs and related issues
in disease outbreak contexts, and how the absence of clear regulation leads to
a host of economic and ethical problems.
A. The Insufficiency of the Current State of the Law
Even with the promulgation of the IHR and the international recognition
of human rights in the medical experimentation context, the majority of
122 SAUWAKON RATANAWIJITRASIN & ESHETU WONDEMAGEGNEHU, EFFECTIVE DRUG
REGULATION: A MULTICOUNTRY STUDY 11 (WHO, 2002), available at http://apps.who.int/
medicinedocs/pdf/s2300e/s2300e.pdf.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., CDER Forum for International Drug Regulatory Authorities, FDA, http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm167011.htm (discussing the FDA conference for
international drug regulatory authorities); International Conference of Drug Regulatory
Authorities, WHO, http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/regulation_legislation/
icdra/en/ (discussing the WHO drug regulatory authority annual conference).
126 See Meier, supra note 57, at 535 (contending that the need for resources pushes
governments to avoid regulation); see also Giorgetti, supra note 16, at 1356–58 (arguing that
the failed and failing states in Africa face perilous health problems because their government
systems are incapable of promulgating and enforcing adequate regulation).
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global health law is still far from being “global.”127 Rather, “[t]oday’s global
health discourse is dominated by terms such as ‘fragmentation’ and
‘duplication,’ with a proliferation of actors, pictorially represented as an
incomprehensible, tangled web of agencies and programs.”128 This makes
regulating experimental medicine in a crisis like the Ebola outbreak a
nightmare for all of the actors involved for numerous reasons.
First, the four major international health law documents detailed above do
not specifically address the use of experimental medicines during disease
outbreaks. Further, despite being the sole international documents governing
the use of experimental medicine, three of these documents, and the
standards that they promote, have not been “afforded the weight of binding
international law, but carry only suggestive or persuasive weight in
regulating conduct by doctors or in finding liability for individuals accused
of unethical experimental research.”129
The only binding document
governing experimental medicine in the international arena is the ICCPR,
which merely requires informed consent in the context of medical
experimentation.130 As a whole, this body of documents proves ineffective
in guiding decision-makers faced with difficult economic and ethical
decisions during disease outbreak scenarios.
Second, the WHO does not have the enforcement power necessary to
govern during disease outbreak situations. At this point, no IHR provision or
committee has addressed the use of experimental medicine in an epidemic
context even though the IHR serves as the primary regulatory instrument of
the WHO during outbreaks. More demonstrative of the WHO’s lack of
power to regulate experimental medicines is the fact that, despite meeting
multiple times after experimental medicine was first used to combat Ebola in
West Africa, the Emergency Committee did not address this use.131
Although it has promulgated many guidelines and other forms of soft law
governing the use of experimental medicine, the WHO has no enforcement
power over these documents.132 Instead, the WHO standards and guidelines
fall prey to the common shortfalls of soft law because they lack
accountability measures, vary in precision, and even include some regulatory
See Joshua D. Reader, Note, The Case Against China: Establishing International
Liability For China’s Response to the 2002–2003 SARS Epidemic, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 519,
531 (2006) (“[I]nternational health law holds fast to the boundaries of state sovereignty.”).
128 Gostin & Friedman, supra note 58, at 26.
129 Carr, supra note 59, at 48.
130 Farrell, supra note 64, at 143.
131 1st Meeting of the IHR Committee, supra note 95; 2nd Meeting of the IHR Committee,
supra note 95.
132 Gostin & Friedman, supra note 58, at 22.
127
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gaps.133 Thus, the WHO does not provide effective or comprehensive
international law governing the use of experimental medicine in outbreak
contexts. Instead, the applicable law varies by country.
Finally, experimental drug regulation that exists in developing countries,
particularly African countries, is often ineffective because these countries
lack the legal systems necessary to effectuate enforcement and corresponding
liability against violators of these regulations.134
Moreover, many
developing African nations resist the push to regulate experimental
medicines. In what has been termed a race to the bottom, these countries aim
to encourage pharmaceutical companies to pour money, medical research
subsidies, and medical necessities into the economy by offering their citizens
as human test subjects.135 In doing so, they maintain the fewest restrictions
or regulations on medical experimentation.136 Further, developing countries
devote disproportionately less of their total government spending to health
care.137 This problem is compounded by the “substitution effect,” whereby
developing governments reduce the percentage of government spending put
toward healthcare as they obtain more foreign aid to subsidize their health
systems.138
Thus, the current state of the law regarding the use of experimental
medicine is wholly insufficient to manage responses to disease outbreaks by
all of the actors involved. Under the current scheme, regulators are stripped
of any authority because the governing international instruments operate as
Id.
Meier, supra note 57, at 532 n.119. The lack of aptly structured legal systems and
appropriate remedies that are common features in developing countries has led to attempts by
foreign citizens to seek aid from the U.S. legal system for injuries resulting from human
experimentation by American pharmaceutical companies via the Alien Tort Claims Act. See
Abdullahi, 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); infra Parts III.B.2–3.
135 Meier, supra note 57, at 532; see also Wollensack, supra note 111, at 756 (explaining
that Pfizer brought Trovan, an experimental drug that caused dangerous symptoms in animal
testing trials, to Kano at the request of the government because the country had been
“devastated” by cholera and measles).
136 See Meier, supra note 57, at 532 n.124, for a clear example of how this race to the
bottom theory plays out across African countries in the informed consent context. Zimbabwe
requires written informed consent for human experimentation. Id. However, some countries,
including Malawi, Tanzania, and Zaire, do not require informed consent. Id.
137 Gostin & Friedman, supra note 58, at 43. African countries, on average, devote less than
ten percent of their total government spending to healthcare, while the global average of
healthcare expenditures as a portion of total government spending is greater than fourteen
percent. Id. However, African countries are not the only ones to experience this trend; some
developing Asian countries spend even less as a percentage of their total government
spending. Id. at 43–44.
138 Id.
133
134

2015] EBOLA, EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE, ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS

153

non-binding soft law that is unenforceable. Moreover, the overall regulatory
approach is so disjointed that national governments, drug producers, drug
consumers, and hosts of other parties are faced with difficult decisions
during these situations.
B. Problems Created by the Existing Systems’ Lack of Globalized Regulatory
Standards
No treaty or multilateral agreement governs the use of experimental
medicine outside of the human experimentation context. As a result,
infectious disease outbreaks pose many problems for both producers and
consumers of these drugs. First, both parties are faced with legal uncertainty
and the implications that flow from the inability to accurately predict where
or to what extent the pharmaceutical companies can be held liable for
producing dangerous medicines. Second, the unregulated production of
medicine creates the potential for negative externalities to be felt by those
who are least able to bear the additional cost. Finally, as noted by the
WHO’s Ethics Committee, the use of experimental medicine in an infectious
disease scenario introduces numerous ethical complexities that must be
addressed by some governing body.139
All of these problems are
compounded during a disease outbreak because of the time constraints and
the high demand for a quick and effective treatment. The only way to
address all of these issues is to have a readily enforceable agreement to
govern the use of experimental medicines in these contexts.
1. Legal Liability and Acting in the Shadow of Legal [Un]Certainty
One of the problems that both potential producers and users of these
experimental medicines face under the current legal system is uncertainty. 140
Drug producers lack clear guidance as to where and to what extent they can
be held liable for harm potentially caused by their experimental medicines.
As a result, producers are forced to make economic efficiency decisions
about the production and provision of their drugs without the data necessary

Ethical Considerations, supra note 13, at 1.
See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case for Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (providing the legal background from
which this Note analyzes legal uncertainty in disease outbreak contexts).
139
140
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to make many important risk calculations.141 Consequently, such companies
run the risk of over- or under-producing medicines depending on their
particular level of risk aversion.142
For the consumers of these medicines, uncertainty with respect to future
legal liability likely plays less of a role in the decision-making process due to
their dire medical concerns. However, legal liability becomes much more of
a concern to the consumers when these medicines cause negative long-term
health effects.
2. Conflicting Interests and Normative Considerations in the Shadow of
the Law
The problems of legal uncertainty that plague producers and consumers of
experimental medicines have been well documented.143 One relatively recent
example of these problems played out in Pfizer’s Trovan drug trial in Kano,
Nigeria, and resulted in U.S. tort litigation. In 1996, Pfizer brought Trovan,
an experimental antibiotic that had not been approved for human use in the
U.S., to Kano to fight a severe outbreak of bacterial meningitis.144 Initially,
Pfizer claimed that they had been invited by Nigerian government officials to
test Trovan, and that the trial had been approved by an ethics committee
from a hospital in Kano.145 Under that authority, Pfizer spent “less than two
months” in Kano distributing the drug and recording results.146 Upon
returning to the U.S., Pfizer reported the results of the trial to the FDA and
received approval to begin selling the antibiotic to U.S. consumers.147 In
1997, the FDA discovered that some of the documents submitted by Pfizer

141 See generally John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (explaining the economic
effects of legal uncertainty).
142 See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., The Rise of Litigation in Human Subjects Research,
139 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 40, 44 (2003) (arguing that an increase in successful litigation
against producers of experimental medicines could increase the cost of drug research,
development, and production, and would thus disincentivize future production).
143 See, e.g., Katherine A. Davis, An International Drug Administration: Curing Uncertainty
in International Pharmaceutical Product Liability, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 685 (1998)
(addressing the problem of legal uncertainty for pharmaceutical companies that operated
internationally in the 1990s).
144 Carr, supra note 59, at 28–29 n.123.
145 Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug Trials through
Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 898 (2008).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 898–99.
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concerning the ethical approval of the trial were forged.148 One year later,
the Washington Post reported that Pfizer operated the drug trial
unethically.149 As a result of this unethical experimentation, eleven of the
ninety-nine children treated with Trovan died, and many others “were left
brain damaged, deaf or paralyzed.”150
The victims of the Trovan drug trial in Kano initiated a lawsuit in the U.S.
under the Alien Tort Statute alleging that Pfizer breached provisions of “the
[Nuremberg] Code, the Declaration, the ICCPR, and the ‘law of nations.’ ”151
After years of contentious litigation, the district court dismissed the suit for a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on the basis of forum non
conveniens.152 The court reasoned that although the plaintiffs’ claim of nonconsensual medical experimentation correctly alleged a violation of the law
of nations, it failed to create a private right of action sufficient to fall within
the jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statute.153 Moreover, the court concluded
dismissal to be proper under forum non conveniens analysis since the
plaintiffs’ “generalized allegations of corruption and bias” failed to preclude
a determination that Nigeria was an adequate alternative forum.”154
While this case demonstrates the inaccessibility of the U.S. legal system
to non-citizens subjected to medical experimentation, it also highlights the
legal uncertainty that plaques both pharmaceutical companies and the
subjects of medical experimentation. Without access to the court systems
where these pharmaceutical companies are incorporated, the consumers of
these drugs are forced to seek relief from their home nation. In many cases,
Id. at 899.
Id. at 899–900. In particular, the Washington Post report exposed a lack of informed
consent by many of the patients and violations of drug trial protocols. Id.
150 Carr, supra note 59, at 30.
151 Khan, supra note 145, at 903.
152 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 CIV.8118(WHP), 2005 WL 1870811 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,
2005).
153 Id. at *9–14.
154 Id. at *15.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009). Although the court
concluded nonconsensual medical experimentation to be a violation of customary
international law that fell within the jurisdiction of the Alien Tort Statue, it ultimately
remanded the suit for further analysis under alternative choice of law principles. Id. at 190.
Ultimately, Pfizer opted to settle the matter in 2009. Joe Stephens, Pfizer to Pay $75 Million
to Settle Nigerian Trovan Drug-Testing Suit, WASH. POST, July 31, 2009, http://www.washi
ngtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/30/AR2009073001847.html. However, the
U.S. Supreme Court has since sharply limited the ability for victims of atrocities that occur
abroad to avail themselves of the U.S. court system via the Alien Tort Statue. See Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (concluding a presumption against
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute).
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149
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the nations where the trials would be expected to take place are less
developed, rebuilding from a devastating event like a disease outbreak or
civil war, suffering from severe governmental corruption, or lack
sophisticated court systems.155 These scenarios make it difficult, if not
impossible, for both the producers and consumers to factor legal liability into
their decision-making calculus.
3. Reassessing the Existing Regime Design and Its Consequences
Under the current scheme, legal liability resulting from outbreak
scenarios is subject to numerous factors that make it nearly impossible for
pharmaceutical companies to make accurate predictions and adjust their
production accordingly. At first glance, this issue seems as though it could
be remedied by a regulatory body mandating that violations of ethical
standards resulted in either strict liability or no liability on the part of
producers. However, a system built on either of these two extremes would
distort the behavior of the pharmaceutical companies at the expense of those
suffering from the disease, or at the expense of obtaining the overall goal of
ending or substantially curbing the effects of the disease.
By creating a no-liability system, the regulatory body would be inviting
pharmaceutical companies to violate human rights by exploiting dying and
diseased individuals in order to quickly find an effective drug that they could
put on the market. Unaccountable for their actions, these companies would
have no incentive to follow ethical norms or formal experimentation
guidelines. Instead, market competition and profit motivation would
encourage companies to conduct unethical experiments in an effort to
produce an effective drug at the lowest possible cost. Since drug producers
would have no additional incentive to follow ethical guidelines—which
necessarily increase the cost and time it takes to conduct medical research—
it is likely such human experimentation would violate the human rights
initiatives laid out in the Declaration and ICCRP.
Strict liability produces results at the other end of the spectrum. Knowing
they would be strictly liable for violations of ethical regulations—even if
their violations were unintentional—pharmaceutical companies would likely
be unwilling to invest in conducting research to aid in disease outbreaks. In
particular, incentivizing companies to perform the costly research necessary
to find a cure or preventative vaccine for Ebola is complicated by the fact
155 See Khan, supra note 145, at 905 (noting that one of the judges who was scheduled to
hear the Pfizer case in Nigeria accepted bribes to delay the trial).
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that the market for such high-price medicines often arises in undeveloped
countries that are unable to shoulder such costs.156 Moreover, by applying a
strict liability standard, and thus increasing the cost of research, the regulator
would only further discourage the development of much-needed medicines
by lowering the already slim chance for profit. The same theory applies to
disease outbreak scenarios that are not solely limited to undeveloped
countries: a rise in the cost of research—which in the case of strict liability
would be considerable—would presumably discourage the development of
new drugs.
Thus, the problem of legal uncertainty, or during the extreme scenarios
previously mentioned, the problem of legal certainty, has to be addressed by
any regulation seeking to govern experimental medicines in disease outbreak
contexts. However, legal uncertainty is only one facet of what is truly a trilemma for regulators in this scenario. Once regulators account for the
uncertainty and the responses by all parties to that uncertainty, they are faced
with the difficulty of economic and ethical allocation decisions.
4. Economics and Ethics
During the current Ebola outbreak, there has been an extreme shortage of
effective medicine. This problem is the result of numerous factors: little
research has been conducted on the virus because it is relatively rare; Ebola
has been isolated to Africa, where market conditions provide little to no
incentive for producers to conduct costly research; and the drugs that have
been produced, like ZMapp, have not been produced in quantities large
enough to meet the extreme demand. However, the undersupply of medicine
is not unique to this Ebola outbreak. Viruses and diseases are rapidly
evolving and becoming resistant to the readily available drugs.157
Consequently, the likelihood that this problem will occur in future disease
outbreaks is high.
Pharmaceutical companies have an incentive to take advantage of this
undersupply problem. This is especially true in unregulated markets, where
effective drugs are not readily available, and where an outbreak occurs with a
Pharmaceutical companies have relied on monetary aid from government institutions of
developed nations to partially fund the development of Ebola-related drugs. See, e.g.,
Ebola/Marbug Research, NIH, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/ebolamarburg/research/pages/
default.aspx (detailing U.S. efforts to aid both public and private Ebola-related medicine
research).
157 See Viruses and Evolution, THE HISTORY OF V ACCINES, http://www.historyofvaccines.
org/content/articles/viruses-and-evolution (detailing the process of virus evolution).
156
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disease as lethal as Ebola. Lacking competition, the companies who produce
these experimental medicines—if left unregulated—can effectively charge as
much as they see fit. Consumer demand for medicine increases drastically in
response to a demand shock such as a disease outbreak, those dying of Ebola
are more willing to pay for access to experimental medicines that may
potentially save their lives.158 Naturally, producers exploit this high demand
and willingness to pay by charging exorbitant prices for experimental
medicine.159
Regardless of whether or not the potential for pharmaceutical companies
to charge high prices is considered an economically efficient outcome,160 the
potential for price gauging raises allocation concerns. Under a purely
economic system of allocation, which takes no notice of ethical concerns, the
medicine would be given to those willing to pay the highest price.
Theoretically, this is a rather simple system of allocation. However, it
becomes more complicated when third party actors can get involved.
As seen in this Ebola outbreak, states and aid groups gained access to the
experimental medicine before it was given to patients. This implies that the
experimental medicine was either given to the aid groups and states by the
producers, or that these groups were the highest bidders for the medicine.
How those groups gained access to the limited supply of ZMapp is still
unknown. The groups also did not reveal how they chose which patients to
give the medicine to once they had access to it.
The WHO addressed the uncertainty that surrounded the distribution of
ZMapp when the Ethics Committee issued its report concerning the use of
experimental drugs in the Ebola outbreak.161 The Ethics Committee put
aside economic considerations and noted that the ethical allocation of the
medicine should be the priority.162 The panel, composed of ethics scholars,
An individual’s willingness to pay for a particular drug or vaccine is a distinct concept from
an individual’s ability to pay for it. See, e.g., Eleonor C. Saulo et al., Willingness and Ability to
Pay for Artemisinin-Based Combination Therapy in Rural Tanzania, 7 MALARIA J. 227 (2008),
available at http://www.malariajournal.com/content/7/1/227 (conveying the difference between
the willingness and ability to pay for malaria medicine).
159 This is known as “price gouging.” See Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks,
Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY. L.J.
535 (2005–2006) (discussing the economic argument for price-gouging and the justifications for
anti-gouging laws).
160 Many economists believe that “[p]roducers who raise prices to the level consumers are
willing to pay are simply performing as Adam Smith’s invisible hand would direct” and that
gouging is just reaching “market equilibrium.” Id. at 536. Yet, anti-gouging laws have been
defended using economic efficiency arguments as well. Id. at 557–59.
161 Ethical Considerations, supra note 13.
162 Id.
158

2015] EBOLA, EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE, ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS

159

suggested that the criteria that should be considered when allocating these
drugs should be: “distributive justice,” “reciprocity and social usefulness,”
“likelihood of a positive impact on both individual and public health
outcomes,” the “clinical stage of the disease,” and “the characteristics of the
unregistered medical product.”163
Many of the ethical allocation problems posed by this scenario were
outside the scope of the Committee’s report, and will inevitably result in
problems that regulators will have to face in the future. For example, an
issue arises in determining which party—state governments or private
pharmaceutical producers—should be given the power to make allocation
decisions based on the Committee’s recommended criteria. A similar
question presents itself in deciding which party bears the cost of research,
production, and distribution of these medicines. Finally, regulators will
inevitably face difficulty in determining which of the recommended criteria
take precedence over others.
Outside of allocation concerns, outbreak scenarios create other economic
and ethical problems related to the use of experimental medicine. The first
of these is the concern regarding human experimentation. The exploitation
of populations suffering from disease outbreaks in Africa is welldocumented.164 Consequently, regulators should be wary when allowing
pharmaceutical companies to use these populations and scenarios as testing
grounds for new medicine. Nevertheless, regulators should also be aware of
the problems that would arise if experimentation in these scenarios was
completely disallowed. Forcing producers to undergo the full research
process before allowing them to distribute medicine in these outbreak
scenarios would significantly increase the length of time these diseases exist
and keep much needed aid from reaching those affected.165 Correspondingly,
this would increase the number of individuals who are, or could potentially
be, infected. This result is the opposite of what the WHO and other

Id. at 6.
The short course AZT vaccination trial and the Trovan trial are two examples of human
rights violations that resulted from the human experimentation process conducted in Africa.
See Meier, supra note 57, for an in-depth discussion on the short course AZT trial and its
relation to the current state of the law governing human experimentations. For a discussion of
the Trovan trial and its relation to the current state of the law governing human
experimentation, see Khan, supra note 145.
165 As a result of this problem, the research and approval process for Ebola-related drugs has
been expedited in the U.S. by the NIH. Questions and Answers: Phase One Clinical Trials of
NIAID/GSK Investigational Ebola Vaccine, NIH (Aug. 28, 2014), available at http://www.
niaid.nih.gov/news/QA/Pages/EbolaVaxQA.aspx.
163
164
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regulators aim for when they allow, or even fast track, experimental
medicine trials in outbreak scenarios.166
Another notable concern is the potential for fake cures and
sensationalism.167 Due to the prevelance of social media, news about disease
outbreaks and related issues spreads faster than ever before. This can be
seen as both a blessing and a curse. The WHO has used social media sites,
including Twitter, to disseminate important information about this Ebola
outbreak.168 However, some have used these same sites to spread false
statements in an effort to incite fear and take advantage of others’ lack of
knowledge about the disease. For example, during the height of the
outbreak, one Twitter user claimed that turmeric could cure Ebola.169 Claims
about false cures became so pervasive that both the WHO and the FDA have
issued formal statements acknowledging that there are currently no known
cures for the disease.170
While these are some of the most common economic and ethical concerns
related to the use of experimental medicine in disease outbreak contexts, they
do not begin to cover all of the potential issues that regulators face. The
current state of the law governing experimental medicine is too disjointed
and lacks the necessary enforcement power to adequately account for all of
these economic and ethical issues. Since these situations present so many
different complexities, it is imperative that some regulatory instrument is
created to give guidance to all of the various actors involved and provide
some enforcement power to the guidelines that currently govern the use of
experimental medicine.
C. Is There a Feasible Solution?
The legal uncertainty, economic inefficiency, and ethical ramifications of
the current legal framework governing the use of experimental medicine in
disease outbreak contexts demonstrate that it is highly insufficient.
Moreover, the absence of binding international law and the array of different
national standards and mechanisms used to govern experimental medicines
indicate that a globalized solution may still be years away. However, the
Id.
Alexandra Sifferlin, Fake Cures and Ebola-Drug Sensationalism Need to Stop, WHO
Says, TIME (Aug. 15, 2014), http://time.com/3117313/fake-cures-and-ebola-drug-sensationalis
m-need-to-stop-who-says/.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
166
167
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success of the IHR in this particular Ebola outbreak should be considered an
encouraging sign for the potential success of a harmonized agreement.171
Although a universally accepted and binding international agreement should
remain the ultimate goal, it likely is not a realistic expectation for the
foreseeable future.172 Until such an agreement can be reached, this Note
argues that the WHO should enforce the widely accepted standards that
already govern experimental drugs through the Guidelines and the
Declaration, and should implement stop-gap measures to address the specific
concerns that arise from international infectious disease outbreak scenarios
such as the Ebola epidemic. This section first outlines how an ideal system
in which a universally accepted multilateral and binding international
agreement governing the use of experimental medicine would operate. Next,
it puts forth a more realistic recommendation in which the WHO operates as
the chief regulatory body that assumes authority in crisis scenarios such as
international disease epidemics.
1. The Ideal Solution
Ultimately, a global, binding, and enforceable international agreement
governing the use of experimental medicine would be ideal. This instrument
would create a legal system that reduces uncertainty by promulgating
mandatory standards and enforcing those standards through a reliable court
system.173 The court system, comprised of a panel of multinational ethical
and pharmaceutical expert judges, would function solely on an as-needed
basis to specifically address violations of the standards.174 Violations of the
mandatory standards would result in strict penalties, particularly monetary
penalties, which could be enforced quickly and efficiently. Monetary
penalties would likely be particularly effective in reducing oversupply since
171 The WHO has reported high levels of compliance with both the IHR reporting system
and the recommendations provided by the IHR Emergency Committee during this Ebola
outbreak. WHO Statement on the 3rd Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding
the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WHO (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediace
ntre/news/statements/2014/ebola-3rd-ihr-meeting/en/; 2nd Meeting of IHR Emergency
Committee, supra note 95; 1st Meeting of IHR Emergency Committee, supra note 95.
172 One of the main impediments to the establishment of a binding international agreement is
the issue of national sovereignty. Khan, supra note 145, at 906.
173 This Note posits a purely hypothetical agreement that could address some of the legal,
economic, and ethical issues raised by the Ebola outbreak.
174 The hypothetical court system envisioned could in some ways be similar to U.S. “vaccine
courts.” See generally Vaccine Claims/Office of Special Masters, U.S. COURTS, http://www.
uscfc.uscourts.gov/vaccine-program-readmore (explaining the court system specifically
developed to hear vaccine claims in the U.S.).
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the offending pharmaceutical companies would finally be made to feel the
full cost of their actions. In addition, compliance with these standards would
ensure that the pharmaceutical companies would have access to lucrative
medicine markets, like those in developed nations, and access to countries in
need of experimental medicine.175 Unfortunately, the ideal solution, like the
hypothetical agreement posited by this Note, is rarely, if ever, the feasible or
realistic one. This particular solution would likely be impeded by conflicts
related to national sovereignty.176
2. WHO as Chief Regulator
Short of the ideal binding multinational involvement, an agreement
granting power to the WHO to become the chief regulatory authority over
experimental medicines in disease outbreak contexts would be sufficient to
solve the majority of the problems that result from international disease
epidemics. In order for the WHO to have any enforceable power, both
developed and developing nations would have to submit to WHO authority
during these disease outbreak scenarios. Submission to WHO authority is
not an unrealistic expectation; many countries have already done so under
the implementation of the IHR.177 After gaining regulatory authority, the
WHO would need to bar access to the court systems of developed countries
for individuals harmed as a result of taking experimental medicines provided
in an infectious disease epidemic. Closing off the court systems would ease
the pharmaceutical companies’ concerns over legal uncertainty.178 Instead,
the WHO could provide a legal remedy to individuals harmed by the
experimental medicines or the experimental process, by setting up a panel of
experts to hear cases of human rights violations. For extreme violations, the
WHO would be granted the authority to enforce monetary penalties. The
WHO should also be delegated power to enforce the ethical standards that
As long as the pharmaceutical companies complied with the regulations, developed
nations would agree to allow the companies to market their drugs—even those drugs not
produced to fight infectious diseases. Further, pharmaceutical companies with a record of
compliance would be the first companies that the governing body would grant access to
developing nations in need of experimental medicine.
176 See Khan, supra note 145, at 906 (discussing the impediments to binding international
law health agreements).
177 See David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious Diseases and
International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 836–38 (1997) (explaining how the pre-2005 IHR
became binding international law).
178 Although this proposition seems counterintuitive, by closing the court systems that are
plagued by the varying standards and jurisdictional confusion detailed above, pharmaceutical
companies can better predict their level of liability.
175
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have already been promulgated in the Declaration and the Guidelines. Along
with those ethical standards, the WHO should implement regulations to
address other notable concerns such as price gouging.
To increase the potency of the WHO’s jurisdiction in this situation,
pharmaceutical companies should be required to submit to WHO regulatory
authority to obtain access to experimental subjects in affected regions during
disease outbreaks. In order to further incentivize compliance, the WHO
should provide a market-based benefit to the pharmaceutical companies.179
To keep these drug manufacturers out of developing nations without the
permission of the WHO, those developing nations would have to submit to
the authority of the WHO as well. Developing nations would have a strong
incentive to do so because access to foreign aid during these outbreaks would
stem from a relationship with the WHO.180
Willing submission to this sort of emergency, short-term solution by all
parties—developed nations, developing nations, and pharmaceutical
companies—would temporarily remedy the legal uncertainty, and the
economic and ethical concerns that plague international outbreak scenarios
until a long-term binding agreement could be established.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the ultimate solution, regulation is necessary to address the
use of experimental medicine in disease outbreak contexts. The 2014 Ebola
outbreak in West Africa has exposed many of the problems with a disjointed
international health system. One of those exposed issues was the use of the
experimental medicine, including medicines previously untested on human
patients, to combat the disease. As the death toll rose in West Africa, so too
did the demand for medical intervention. However, the response by the
medical research and pharmaceutical communities occurred before the
medical regulatory bodies could respond. As a result, the law governing the
distribution and use of experimental medicine has yet to be tailored to
address the unique circumstances posed by the Ebola outbreak.
Some scholars have insisted that economic incentives can have the effect of ensuring
compliance with soft law. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 145, at 909–11 (explaining one way
that economic incentives can be used to enforce compliance on the part of pharmaceutical
companies).
180 In the current Ebola outbreak, the affected African nations have shown a willingness to
collaborate with and submit to the authority of the WHO in order to expedite access to
experimental drugs for their citizens. African Regulators’ Meeting Looking to Expedite
Approval of Vaccines and Therapies for Ebola, WHO, http://www.who.int/medicines/news/A
FR_reg_meet/en/.
179
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The current state of the law governing the use of experimental medicine
on an international scale is almost non-existent. None of the documents
governing international health adequately address the legal uncertainty,
economic problems, and ethical issues involved with the use of experimental
medicine in international disease outbreaks like the current Ebola outbreak.
This leaves a gap that must be filled by sound governments or enterprising
pharmaceutical companies. The ideal long-term solution may be to create an
international binding agreement to govern the use of experimental medicine
in disease outbreak contexts. However, the WHO should step in to
implement stop-gap measures to provide a more immediate solution. In the
absence of quickly implemented and effective regulation, the Ebola outbreak
of 2014 may be forever memorialized by the travesties of the experimental
Trovan and short-course AZT trials.

